

# **FROM DETECTION TO RESILIENCE: BEYOND THE SOC TO TRUE CRISIS READINESS**

Jamie Roderick, VP Detect and Respond,  
LRQA



**LEADERSHIP  
SERIES**

# CYBER THREAT - 2025

# HIGH-LEVEL STATEMENTS

Consider the following:

**22,000+** cyber attacks occur globally each day (1 every 39 seconds)

**Ransomware** accounts for 68% of detected threats, with 236M cases in 2024

Average restoration to basic service: **23 days**, full system functionality: months

Average ransom demand: **\$2M**, with 94% of initial demands paid

Average cost to business **\$4.88M**

Access to Encryption: 0 to 116 days


- 15% encryption in one day of access
- 1/3 within 48 hours of access

Phishing attacks increased by **1,265%**, driven by generative AI. 3.4Bn+ emails sent daily


Cloud intrusions increased by **75%**, with 23% due to misconfigurations

DDoS attacks rose by **31%**, with an average of **44k** attacks per day

# TOP TARGETED INDUSTRIES, SEP 24 – MAR 25




Source: Recorded Future



# THREAT LANDSCAPE

## How long do data breaches impact?

Average Distribution of Data Breach Costs in Low vs High Regulation Environments



- Highly regulated environments incurred 45% of breach costs in the first year, 31% in the second year, and 24% more than 2 years after a breach
- Driven by new regulatory fines and the introduction of **breach notification laws**

# SO YOU HAVE A SOC...

# SOC CHALLENGES

## Common issues affecting SOC monitoring capabilities

### Volume and velocity of alerts

- Massive data inflow from cloud, endpoints and applications
- Alert fatigue due to high false positive rate
- Difficulty in prioritising what truly matters

### Complexity of modern environments

- Hybrid and Multi-Cloud architectures introduce visibility gaps
- Custom development and rapid deployment cycles outpace traditional monitoring steps
- Asset sprawl makes it hard to track what's in scope

### Advanced threats and evasion techniques

- Attackers using living-off-the-land tactics, fileless malware and AI-driven obfuscation
- Threats often bypass signature-based detections and exploit behavioural blind spots

### Siloed Cyber Functions

- SOC's often operate independently from IR, TI and crisis teams
- Lack of integration delays response and reduces situational awareness



# SOC CHALLENGES

## Common issues affecting SOC monitoring capabilities

### Third-party (and fourth/fifth party) and supply chain risk

- SOC's may not have visibility into vendor activity or access levels
- Delegated tasks does not mean delegated responsibility – monitoring is essential

### Talent shortage and burnout

- Skilled persons are in short supply and often overwhelmed
- Retention is difficult in high-pressure, reactive environments

### Limited automation and AI adoption

- Many SOC's still rely on manual triage and investigation
- AI and Orchestration tools are misunderstood, under-utilised or poorly integrated


### Inadequate testing and simulation

- Response plans are rarely tested in realistic multi-faceted scenarios (including technology and business elements)
- Lack of muscle memory leads to confusion during real incidents





# DECISION MAKING IN A CRISIS



# THE HUMAN REACTION

## Fear, uncertainty and doubt

- Impacts all clients
- Natural human reaction
- You need to the right as soon as possible to enable you to make rational and risk-based decisions
- Emotive decisions are problematic
- Being comfortable with being uncomfortable
- You may not have the data to answer all questions
- Focus on impact, not the cause (at least initially)
- Cognitive bias

## The 5 Stages of Grief



Denial



Anger



Bargaining



Depression




Acceptance

# INCIDENT RESPONSE LIFE CYCLE (OLD VERSION)

**Ransomware: requires “you to be brave and make effective and decisive isolation/shutdown decisions”**


- NIST SP-800-61r2
- Steps are largely linear
- Worked quite well until...
- Ransomware, AI, Badness as a service and the related scale and complexity of attacks
- Which has led to a bit of a re-think in v3




# INCIDENT RESPONSE LIFE CYCLE (NEW VERSION)

**Ransomware: requires “you to be brave and make effective and decisive isolation/shutdown decisions”**

- NIST SP-800-61r3
- Simpler approach to enable a greater range of actions
- Based on continuous improvement
- Includes a Governance task



# CYBER INCIDENT MANAGEMENT IN A CRISIS




# INCIDENT EVOLUTION

## Tactical functions and capabilities over incident lifecycle



# THE PATH TO RESILIENCE

# HOPE IS NOT A STRATEGY



| Sun Tzu Principle                        | Cyber Resilience Application                                                   |
|------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| “Readiness to receive him”               | Incident response plans, rehearsals, and simulations.                          |
| “Not on the chance of his not attacking” | Assume breach mindset; threat-informed defence.                                |
| “Made our position unassailable”         | Strong baseline controls, segmentation, zero trust, and recovery capabilities. |



The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy’s not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable.

Sun Tzu | Ancient Chinese military strategist and author of The Art of War



# "KNOW THYSELF" (GREEK: γνῶθι σεαυτόν)

"**Know thyself**" is most famously associated with **Socrates**; originally one of the **Delphic maxims** inscribed at the **Temple of Apollo at Delphi**. Socrates adopted it as a philosophical cornerstone, encouraging introspection and self-awareness as the foundation of wisdom.

In cyber strategy, this principle translates into a foundational truth:

**YOU CAN NOT DEFEND  
WHAT YOU DO NOT UNDERSTAND**

# THE IMPORTANCE OF SELF-AWARENESS AND INTELLIGENCE IN STRATEGY

**Victory comes not just from strength, but from understanding:**

- Your own capabilities and limitations.
- The strengths, weaknesses, and intentions of your adversary.

**In a cyber resilience context, this can be applied as:**

- **Know yourself** → Understand your assets, vulnerabilities, and response capabilities.
- **Know your enemy** → Understand threat actors, tactics, and emerging risks.



If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.

Sun Tzu | Ancient Chinese military strategist and author of *The Art of War*

# 6 CORE AREAS

## Asset Visibility

Maintain real-time inventory of systems, data, applications and endpoints

Especially critical in cloud, hybrid and custom dev environments

1

## Risk Awareness

Understand the organisation's risk appetite & threat exposure

Map vulnerabilities to business impact, not just technical severity

2

## Baseline Security Posture

Know your current controls: Patching, Identity Management, Access control

Use frameworks like Cyber Essentials, or NIST CSF to benchmark

3

## Operational Readiness

Know your response capabilities: IR Plans, SOC Maturity, automation & escalation paths

Test and rehearse to build confidence and muscle memory

4

## 3<sup>rd</sup>/4<sup>th</sup>/5<sup>th</sup> Party Dependencies

Know who has access, what they can do, and how they are monitored

Task can be out-sourced, responsibility can not.

5

## Strategic Alignment

Align cyber capabilities with business priorities: Continuity, Reputation, Compliance.

Know how cyber supports resilience, not just prevention

6

# IMPLEMENTING RESILIENCE

# RESILIENCE V REDUNDANCY

**Resilience: the capacity to recover quickly from difficulties; toughness**

- Redundancy: *the inclusion of extra components which are not strictly necessary to functioning, in case of failure in other components*
- Resilience may include elements of redundancy
- Should be modelled against threat scenarios (most likely and most dangerous)
- Risk-based decisions should be documented
- Incident lifecycle must still be followed, even when invoking DR plans
  - Don't recover before you know *how* and *when* they got in
  - Restoring from compromised back-ups is a key gotcha

# KEY ISSUES

1

## Roles and responsibilities

Key stakeholders not aware of their responsibilities, exacerbating incident through either inaction, or poor action

---

2

## Incident response plans

Plans are not in place, not complete or not practised  
Not enough resources to enact the plan (inc BC/DR)

---

3

## False view of security posture

Great dashboard! = Great Security  
Poor practices, poor training, slow/ineffective patching  
Lack of verification of what should be done v what has been done  
Do not know their network

# PRACTICAL ACTIONS

## Building cyber crisis muscle memory

### How we operate:

|                                               |                                                                                                                     |
|-----------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Asset discovery and visibility</b>         | Continuous scanning of cloud and on-prem environments to identify new assets (and changes to existing ones)         |
|                                               | Automatically tagging critical systems for prioritised protection and monitoring                                    |
|                                               | Know the criticality of what you have (Business Impact Assessment) as standard                                      |
| <b>Integrated incident response</b>           | SOC Alerts trigger automated workflows that notify IR teams, isolate affected systems and initiate forensic logging |
|                                               | IR, BC, and DR plans are rehearsed together to ensure seamless execution during a real event                        |
| <b>Threat intelligence operationalisation</b> | External threat feeds are correlated with internal telemetry to detect early indicators of compromise               |
|                                               | Intelligence informs patch prioritisation and containment strategies                                                |
| <b>Simulation and tabletop exercises</b>      | Regular crisis simulations involving cyber, legal, comms and business teams                                         |
|                                               | Exercises test decision-making, escalation paths and recovery speed                                                 |

# PRACTICAL ACTIONS

## Building cyber crisis muscle memory

### How we operate:

|                                              |                                                                                                                    |
|----------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Smart patching strategy                      | Risk-based patching: critical assets patched first, non-critical assets monitored or contained                     |
|                                              | Temporary isolation or service suspension used when patching isn't immediately possible or has been ineffective    |
| Identity and access management               | Role-based access controls and just-in-time provisioning reduce exposure                                           |
|                                              | Continuous monitoring of privileged accounts and third-party access                                                |
| Security hygiene and baseline controls       | Cyber Essentials Plus or similar frameworks implemented and maintained (security is for life, not just for audits) |
|                                              | Regular audits of patching, MFA, logging and endpoint protection                                                   |
| Strategic alignment with business continuity | Cyber risk mapped to business impact                                                                               |
|                                              | Cyber teams embedded in crisis response and continuity planning                                                    |
| Insurance as a safety net, not a strategy    | Regular crisis simulations involving cyber, legal, comms and business teams                                        |
|                                              | Exercises test decision-making, escalation paths and recovery speed                                                |



# COMMUNICATIONS ARE KEY

# COMMON COMMUNICATION THEMES

We are investigating using NCSC accredited forensic partners...

**The highly sophisticated adversary...**

99.9% of access & exploit methods are not sophisticated

**1**

**Exploited a zero day**

It was a zero day 12 months ago and a patch has been available for 11 ½ months...

**2**

**On a third-party managed system**

Need to be very sure about this!

You are still responsible for actions of 3<sup>rd</sup> parties on your network

**3**

**No customer data was exposed or compromised**

Saying this without confirming it to be true, or when insufficient evidence exists to be certain

What do you say if the forensic data doesn't exist to 100% confirm that data was exfiltrated?

**4**

**Our forensic partner confirms/ informs us..**

Errrrr....no we didn't say that

Twisting and deliberate interpretation of our reporting

**5**

# PRINCIPLES

1

**Prepare communications strategy in advance**

---

2

**Communicate clearly with different parties, tailoring message where necessary**

---

3

**Manage the aftermath in the medium to long term**

**References:**

[Guidance on effective communications in a cyber incident](#)  
[Crisis Communication and Incident Response pt. 1](#)  
[Crisis Communication and Incident Response pt. 2](#)

# INCIDENT MANAGEMENT

## What we see works

### Have and lean into your Incident Response Plan

- An incident response plan is one of the most critical components of the customer notification process, as it enables you to acknowledge they've fallen victim to an attack, but also take ownership and focus on the customer
- Following a data breach, the customer ultimately wants to know three things:
- If their data has been stolen
- The risk to the data at the time of the incident
- If they need to take additional action

### Maintain open and consistent comms

- Time is of the essence – you must execute on customer communications as early as possible
- You need to be the go-to source for any information regarding a breach at all times
- Ideally, you should give affected customers a clear understanding of which data was lost and when the incident occurred
- Some of the top questions to ask your team when communicating a data breach include:
  - What happened and what do we know?
  - What is the scope of the incident?
  - How can we impact this, and how exactly can we help the customer?
- Do NOT move too fast and respond without having gathered the right information or assessment of impact, which can change the narrative!!!!

### Be Transparent

- Where possible, provide accurate and timely information that accounts for customer questions and looks after their best interests while also adhering to internal and external legal advice to minimise liability
- If unable to share specific breach details (quite likely) – look at being transparent about the reason for not immediately releasing information publicly, i.e., if law enforcement is involved
- Never assume or share with your customers that it won't happen again...
- Assure the affected customer that the incident is being properly contained and managed
- Show that you are prioritising security and taking the necessary steps to mitigate future potential breaches as well



# THANK YOU

**Any questions?**

Jamie Roderick | [jamie.roderick@lrqa.com](mailto:jamie.roderick@lrqa.com)

# LEADERSHIP SERIES

